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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court first announced the exclu-
sionary rule for federal courts in 1914,1 and ex-
tended it to the states in 1961.2 The purpose of this
judicially created rule is to protect the rights guar-
anteed by the fourth amendment 2 The exclusion-
ary rule prohibits the use of evidence obtained as
the result of an illegal search, seizure, or arrest.
4
The primary justification for the exclusionary rule5
is to deter improper police conduct. A second
reason for the rule is to preserve judicial integrity.
6
In formulating the rule, the Court limited its ap-
plication to those cases in which the defendant
could show "standing." A defendant had standing
to contest the use of illegally obtained evidence if
the government had violated his personal fourth
amendment rights.7 According to Jones v. United
States,' the Court defined a person's fourth amend-
ment rights in terms of whether he had a legally
recognized right, such as a possessory or ownership
interest in the premises searched or the property
seized. In addition, Jones extended standing to
those "legitimately on premises where a search
occurs"
9 
and established an exception to the stand-
ing requirement by automatically conferring
standing upon defendants charged with crimes for
which possession constituted an essential element.1"
In Rakas v. Illinois," the Supreme Court substan-
'Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
2 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,482 (1976). The fourth
amendment provides in pertinent part: "The right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated .... " U. S. CONsr. amend. IV.
4 Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Wong Sun v.
United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
5 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 486. For an excellent
discussion of the theories underlying the exclusionary
rule, see Sunderland, Liberals, Conservatives, and the Exclu-
sionaly Rule, 71 J. 1RIM. L. & C. (1980).
6 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 485.
7 Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973).
8 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
9Id. at 267.
to Id. at 264-65.
" 439 U.S. 128 (1978). See Note, Fourth Amendment-
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Automobile Searches, 70 J.
CRIM. L. & C. 498 (1979).
tially altered the standing inquiry by defining
fourth amendment rights in terms of whether the
search or seizure unreasonably infringed upon a
defendant's legitimate expectation of privacy in
the invaded place.12 Under Rakas, a person's own-
ership or possessory interest in the property
searched or seized does not necessarily mean that
he has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the
property.
In June 1980, the Supreme Court decided three
cases that severely restrict the circumstances in
which an accused is entitled to exclusion of evi-
dence obtained by illegal search and seizure. In
United States v. Salvucci,t3 the Court overruled the
Jones automatic standing rule, holding that a de-
fendant charged with a crime of possession may
only invoke the exclusionary rule if his own fourth
amendment rights have been violated. In Rawlings
v. Kentucky,"4 the Court further defined the circum-
stances in which a person can claim fourth amend-
ment protection. The Court held that a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area searched, rather
than ownership of the seized property, entitled the
defendant to challenge the search. Finally, in United
States v. Payner,t 5 the Court held that where the
defendant's own rights are not violated, a court
cannot employ its supervisory powers to exclude
evidence even if the evidence was obtained by
flagrantly illegal governmental conduct.
Salvucci, Rawlings, and Payner clarify the circum-
stances in which a defendant may invoke the fourth
amendment exclusionary rule. These cases deline-
ate the scope of the exclusionary rule in light of the
Rakas test which measures fourth amendment vi-
olations in terms of whether the government un-
reasonably invaded a defendant's legitimate expec-
tation of privacy. In Salvucci, Rawlings, and Payner,
the Court consistently allowed greater use of reli-
able evidence obtained by illegal search and sei-
zure. In addition, these three cases developed the
Rakas concept that standing no longer depends
upon property interests, but rather derives from
I21d. at 140; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 353 (1967).
13 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980).
14 100 S. Ct. 2556 (1980).
I5 100 S. Ct. 2439 (1980).
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privacy interests. The Court apparently believes
that unreasonable police conduct will be deterred
by allowing exclusion of evidence only where the
defendant's personal privacy rights are violated.
UNITED STATES V. SALVUCCI
In United States v. Salvucci, the defendants, John
Salvucci and Joseph Zackular, were charged with
unlawful possession of stolen mail. The grand jury
indicted the defendants based upon twelve checks
police seized during a search pursuant to a warrant
for search of an apartment rented by Zackular's
mother.
Prior to trial, the district court granted the de-
fendants' motion to suppress the checks because
the affidavit used to support the search warrant
application was insufficient to show probable
cause. At the request of the government, the district
court reconsidered its ruling and affirmed the sup-
pression order despite the government's contention
that the defendants lacked standing to contest the
search and seizure.
The court of appeals affirmed 16 finding that the
search warrant was constitutionally inadequate
and that the defendants had standing to invoke
the exclusionary rule by challenging the validity of
the search. 17 The defendants did not have to show
a legitimate expectation of privacy in the premises
searched or the property seized because Jones v.
United States'8 entitled the defendants to automatic
standing. In Jones, the Supreme Court held that a
defendant has automatic standing to challenge the
legality of a search or seizure if that defendant is
charged with a crime for which possession of the
seized evidence constitutes an essential element.' 9
The court of appeals questioned the viability of
Jones but remarked that the Supreme Court must
resolve whether the automatic standing rule should
be altered.2'
In a seven-to-two decision, the Sa'vucci Court
overruled Jones, discarding the automatic standing
exception to the exclusionary rule.21 Justice Rehn-
quist, writing for the majority, believed that the
Court's decisions since Jones had undermined the
premises of the automatic standing rule. 2 TheJones
Court granted automatic standing to a defendant
charged with a possessory crime in order to resolve
16 United States v. Salvucci, 599 F.2d 1094 (1st Cir.
1979).
'7 Id. at 1097.
'8 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
'9 Id.; see also Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. at 229.
20 United States v. Salvucci, 599 F.2d at 1097-98.
21 100 S. Ct. 2547.
22 Id. at 2551.
two types of problems: self-incrimination and pro-
secutorial self-contradiction.
Prior to Jones, a defendant charged with a pos-
sessory crime who wished to assert a fourth amend-
ment claim faced a self-incrimination dilemma. At
a suppression hearing, he had to allege possession
of the evidence sought to be excluded. Yet posses-
sion of this evidence constituted the crime with
which he was charged. If the trial court denied the
motion to suppress, the defendant ran the risk that
the prosecution would use his self-incriminating
statements against him at the trial. Thus, the de-
fendant faced the dilemma of asserting his fourth
amendment claim at the risk of forfeiting his con-
stitutional right against self-incrimination. Jones
cured this problem by granting these defendants
automatic standing, thereby eliminating the need
to allege any personal or possessory interest in the
evidence sought to be excluded.
In Salvucci, Justice Rehnquist believed that Sim-
mons v. United States 3 had resolved the self-incrimi-
nation dilemma.2' In Simmons, the Court held that
testimony given by a defendant in support of a
motion to suppress cannot be admitted against him
at trial as evidence of his guilt.25 Thus, Simmons
allowed a defendant to assert his fourth amend-
ment claim without having to balance the effect of
this assertion on his fifth amendment right against
self-incrimination. By eliminating the risk of self-
incrimination Simmons also alleviated the need for
the automatic standing rule.
The Salvucci Court also noted the defendants'
contention that despite Simmons the automatic
standing rule was necessary to prevent prosecuto-
rial use of suppression testimony for impeachment
at trial. Since Salvucci did not present an impeach-
ment issue, the Court refused to answer the defend-
ant's argument. Thus, the question of whether
Simmons should be extended to provide all defend-
ants more complete protection against self-incrim-
ination by forbidding the use of suppression testi-
mony for impeachment purposes remains an open
question.
Justice Rehnquist also believed that the problem
of prosecutorial self-contradiction no longer ex-
isted. This problem is the converse of the defend-
ant's self-incrimination dilemma. In possession
cases prior to Jones, the government had to oppose
23 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (defendant's suppression testi-
mony may not be used against him at trial as evidence of
his guilt).
2 100 S. Ct. at 2551.
25 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 395.
26 100 S. Ct. at 2552.
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a motion for suppression by contending that a
defendant did not possess the seized goods for
purposes of the fourth amendment. At trial, how-
ever, the government had to prove that the same
defendant possessed the goods in order to secure a
conviction. By automatically granting standing to
defendants charged with possessory crimes, the
Jones Court removed the issue of possession from
the suppression hearings, thereby resolving the
problem of prosecutorial self-contradiction.
According to the Salvucci majority, the Court's
decisions since Jones have resolved the problem of
governmental self-contradiction. Jones was prem-
ised on the concept that possession of a seized good
in itself conferred standing upon a defendant to
challenge the legality of the search and seizure.
However, Rakas altered this concept by establishing
that standing depends only upon a legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy in the area searched. Justice
Rehnquist reasoned that "[t]he person in legal
possession of a good seized during an illegal search
has not necessarily been subject to a Fourth
Amendment deprivation." 27 Thus, a prosecutor
can without contradiction argue that a defendant
suffered no invasion of fourth amendment rights
warranting suppression and that the defendant
unlawfully possessed the goods. In light of both
Simmons and Rakas, the Court concluded that "the
original foundations of Jones are no longer rele-
vant .... ,2 In conclusion, the majority urged not
only that the automatic standing rule lacked jus-
tification, but also that its only present purpose
was to benefit those whose rights had not been
violated. The Court reversed and remanded the
cause to give the defendants an opportunity to
demonstrate that they had a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the place searched.29
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, dis-
sented. He argued that the self-incrimination ra-
tionale still provided adequate justification for the
automatic standing rule. In his view, Simmons did
not resolve that dilemma. Justice Marshall stressed
that the prosecution may still use suppression tes-
timony for impeachment purposes and for the
development of trial strategy.30 Faced with the
possibility that suppression testimony may be used
in this way, a defendant may decide not to chal-
lenge the admissibility of evidence on fourth
amendment grounds in order to avoid the risk of
27 id.
28Id. at 2553.
2 Id. at 2555.
3o Id. at 2555-56 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
aiding the prosecution by self-incrimination. Thus,
despite Simmons, the dissent argued that a defend-
ant may still confront the dilemma of asserting a
fourth amendment claim at the risk of producing
self-incriminating statements which might aid the
prosecution's case.
Justice Marshall also asserted that a possessory
interest in the goods seized should be sufficient to
confer standing regardless of the defendant's ex-
pectation of privacy in the premises searched. The
dissent believed that the requirement of standing
is unnecessary in possession cases where the charge




The Salvucci decision narrows the scope of the
exclusionary rule.Jones created an exception to the
traditional standing requirements by allowing de-
fendants charged with possessory crimes to invoke
the exclusionary rule whether or not their own
fourth amendment rights were violated. After Sal-
vucci, defendants charged with possessory offenses
will not be entitled to exclusion unless they prove
a violation of their own privacy rights.
In light of its recent fourth amendment opinions,
the Court's decision to overrule Jones was not sur-
prising.32 The Salvucci Court relied on Alderman v.
United States's to reaffirm the position that deter-
rence of illegal police conduct does not constitute
a sufficient basis for extending the protections of
the exclusionary rule to persons whose fourth
amendment rights were not violated.Y In reaching
this conclusion, the Alderman Court found that the
fourth amendment does not mandate exclusion in
every case that may deter illegal searches.? The
Court requires exclusion only when the defendant's
own privacy rights have been violated by an un-
reasonable search or seizure. However, weighing
the competing societal interests in prosecution of
the guilty and in deterrence of police misconduct,
the Alderman Court found that the marginal deter-
rent impact that would result by extending the
31 Id. at 2556.
32 See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (adopting the
legitimate expectation of privacy test); Alderman v.
United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969) (holding that sup-
pression of the product of a fourth amendment violation
can be successfully urged only by one whose own rights
were violated by the search); Simmons v. United States,
390 U.S. 377 (holding that suppression testimony may
not be admitted against a defendant as evidence of guilt).
33 394 U.S. 165.
4 100 S. Ct. at 2554.
35 394 U.S. at 174.
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exclusionary rule to defendants whose own rights
were not violated did not justify "further encroach-
ment upon the public interest in prosecuting those
accused of crime and having them acquitted or
convicted on the basis of all the evidence which
exposes the truth.,
3 6
Recent decisions also support the majority's ar-
gument that the problem of prosecutorial self-con-
tradiction no longer exists. Since Rakas3? 7 and Rawl-
ings establish that a privacy interest rather than
a possessory interest is the crucial factor in proving
a fourth amendment interest, a prosecutor can
properly argue that a defendant criminally pos-
sessed a seized good and yet suffered no fourth
amendment violation by its illegal seizure. Even
though Justices Marshall and Brennan asserted in
Salvucci that possessory interests should be sufficient
to confer standing, they acknowledged that the
Rawlings holding, which limited standing to assert
fourth amendment claims to those situations in
which a defendant has a privacy interest in the
area searched, resolved the problem of prosecuto-
rial self-contradiction.
3 9
As for self-incrimination problems, Jones cor-
rectly recognized that defendants charged with
possessory offenses faced far greater risks of self-
incrimination from producing evidence at suppres-
sion hearings than did defendants charged with
nonpossessory offenses. In order to invoke the ex-
clusionary rule before Jones, a defendant had to
prove a possessory or ownership interest in the
place searched or the item seized. Hence, for pos-
sessory-crime defendants, the testimony they pre-
sented in order to establish standing proved an
element of the offense with which they were
charged.' However, for nonpossessory-crime de-
fendants, the risk of aiding the prosecution was not
so great since testimony they produced to establish
standing did not prove an element of the offense
with which they were charged. Jones resolved the
self-incrimination dilemma for possessory-crime
defendants by affording them automatic standing
to challenge the legality of the search and seizure.
Later, Simmons sought to protect both classes of
defendants from incrimination risks by prohibiting
the prosecution's use of suppression testimony to
prove a defendant's guilt.4' The Salvucci Court has
36Id. at 175.
37 439 U.S. 128.
'8 100 S. Ct. 2556; see also text accompanying notes 50-
83 infra.
39 100 S. Ct. at 2556 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
40 Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. at 391.
41 Id. at 394.
now overruled Jones on the grounds that Simmons
provides adequate protection from self-incrimina-
tion to defendants charged with either possessory
or nonpossessory crimes.
With regard to the prosecution's case-in-chief,
Simmons clearly resolved the dilemma of asserting
one's fourth amendment claims at the risk of aiding
the prosecution. However, the Salvucci dissent
voiced concern that suppression testimony might
still be used for impeachment and to aid the pros-
ecution in the preparation of its case and trial
strategy. In response to these concerns, the Salvucci
majority argued that the possibility of aiding the
prosecution in the development of its case consti-
tuted a risk equally applicable to possessory and
nonpossessory situations.42 Despite this possibility,
the Court has refused to extend the automatic
standing rule to nonpossessory-crime defendants.
Therefore, the Court will not retain the rule only
for possessory-crime defendants who face the same
risks.43
Similarly, the risk that suppression testimony
may aid the prosecution by its use for impeachment
purposes appears to apply equally to both classes
of defendants. Under Rakas and Rawlings, regard-
less of whether possession is an element of the
charge, a defendant need only prove that his own
privacy rights have been violated to invoke the
exclusionary rule. Thus, both classes of defendants
must present evidence of a legitimate expectation
of privacy at the suppression hearing. Suppression
testimony by both the defendant seeking exclusion
of a murder weapon and the defendant seeking
exclusion of controlled substances provides the
prosecution with evidence that they had privacy
interests in the areas searched. This suppression
testimony will connect the defendant to the evi-
dence seized only insofar as the defendant must
show a privacy interest in the place where police
seized the evidence. Such testimony may indeed be
damaging to the defendant's case, but suppression
can only be used to impeach the defendant who
alleges that he did not have an interest in the place
where the evidence was found. Thus, while a pos-
sessory-crime defendant may still have to assert a
possessory interest in the evidence seized as a factor
tending to establish a privacy interest, the prose-
cution can only use this testimony to impeach the
defendant's credibility, not to prove his guilt. Sim-
ilarly, the nonpossessory-crime defendant may give
damaging testimony at the suppression hearing
42 100 S. Ct. at 2554 n.7.
43 id.
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which would link him with the place where a
murder weapon or other incriminating evidence
was found. Yet, this testimony is only available to
the prosecution for impeachment purposes. Con-
sequently, both classes of defendants face the same
risk of aiding the prosecution and both are dis-
suaded from giving false testimony at trial. There-
fore, to provide automatic standing to possessory-
crime defendants and to deny such protection to
nonpossessory-crime defendants would be unjust
since both classes should be afforded constitutional
protections against both fourth amendment viola-
tions and self-incrimination.
Although suppression testimony may aid the
prosecution against both classes of defendants, the
potential harm does not justify extending auto-
matic standing to both classes. Such an extension
would totally destroy the requirement that one
must prove a violation of his own fourth amend-
ment rights to urge suppression. The result would
be to relegate the requirements of the exclusionary
rule to a mere showing that the evidence sought to
be admitted was the fruit of an illegal search or
seizure. The Court repeatedly has refused to extend
the exclusionary rule's protection to those whose
rights were not violated" because it views the
societal cost of excluding such relevant and reliable
evidence as greatly impeding the search for truth.45
Thus, exclusion would frustrate two of the basic
values underlying standing rules: society's interest
in truth-finding and in prosecuting the guilty.
Although the question of whether suppression
testimony can be used for impeachment purposes
was not at issue in Salvucci, it will probably come
before the Court at a future date. In Harris v. New
York" and Oregon v. Hass47 the Court allowed the
prosecution to use Miranda48-violative statements
for impeachment when such statements could not
be used as evidence of guilt. In United States v.
Havens49 the Court further permitted the use of
illegally obtained evidence to imipeach statements
made by the defendant on cross-examination even
though such evidence was otherwise inadmissible.
In light of these decisions, the Court will probably
allow prosecutors to use suppression testimony for
impeachment purposes. While such a decision
would substantially further society's interest in
44 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 137-38.
45 Id.
46401 U.S. 222 (1971).
47420 U.S. 714 (1975).
48 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
49 100 S. Ct. at 1912.
truth-finding, defendants would then certainly face
the dilemma of whether to assert fourth amend-
ment claims at the risk of aiding the prosecution.
Such a result illustrates the inherent conflicts be-
tween the goals of deterrence and truth-finding
that arise when an exclusionary rule is used to
protect fourth amendment rights.
RAWLINGS v. KENTUCKY
While Salvucci held that a charge of possession
was not sufficient to confer standing automatically
upon a defendant, Rawlings v. Kentucky5° presented
the issue of whether a defendant is entitled to
exclusion of evidence obtained during an illegal
search when he does not have a legitimate expec-
tation of privacy in the place searched but he does
claim ownership of the evidence seized.
On October 18, 1976, six police officers went to
the home of Lawrence Marquess with a warrant
for his arrest. Five people were at the house when
the police arrived. During an unsuccessful search
for Marquess, the police smelled the odor of mari-
juana and saw marijuana seeds in one of the
bedrooms. Two of the officers left temporarily to
obtain a search warrant, and the other four de-
tained the occupants of the house. During this
time, police allowed two of the occupants to leave
after they consented to body searches required as
a condition to their release. After approximately
forty-five minutes, the two officers returned with a
search warrant for the house. One officer read the
warrant and Miranda warnings to the three remain-
ing occupants, who included Vanessa Cox, and the
defendant David Rawlings.
An officer ordered Cox to empty the contents of
her purse. Contained in the purse were 1,800 tab-
lets of LSD and a number of other controlled
substances. Upon emptying the purse, Cox turned
to Rawlings and told him "'to take what was
his.' ,51 Rawlings then claimed ownership of the
controlled substances. An officer searched Rawl-
ings and placed him under formal arrest.
At a suppression hearing, Rawlings challenged
the admissibility of the drugs and statements he
made to police regarding the drugs on the ground
that this evidence constituted the fruit of an illegal
detention and unlawful search. The trial court
found that Rawlings lacked standing to contest the
search of the purse, and that, in any event, the
search was permissible. Rawlings was convicted of
trafficking in and possession of controlled sub-
50 100 S. Ct. 2556.
5' Id. at 2559.
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stances. The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed,
finding that Rawlings did have standing but that
the detention and searches were legitimate.52 Fi-
nally, the Supreme Court of Kentucky, relying on
Rakas v. Illinois,53 upheld the conviction on the
grounds that Rawlings lacked standing because he
had no legitimate expectation of freedom from
governmental intrusion into the purse.
54
In a split decision, the Court affirmed Rawlings'
conviction. Five Justices voted to affirm, two Jus-
tices, concurring in part, voted to vacate the judg-
ment and to remand to the state court, and two
Justices voted to reverse. Justice Rehnquist, writing
for the majority, held that the Supreme Court of
Kentucky correctly applied Rakas in determining
that Rawlings had failed to lprove that he had a
legitimate expectation of privacy in Cox's purse.
55
2 The opinion of the court of appeals is unreported.
53439 U.S. 128.
"' Rawlings v. Commonwealth, 581 S.W.2d 348 (Ky.
1979).
" 100 S. Ct. at 2556. Rawlings also presented the issues
of whether the defendant's admissions were the fruit of
an illegal detention and whether the search of the de-
fendant's person was lawful. In order to resolve the
admissions question, the Court relied upon Brown v.
Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, which enumerated four factors
relevant to determining whether a confession is the prod-
uct of a free will or whether it is the fruit of an illegal
arrest. These factors are the Miranda warnings, the tem-
poral proximity of the arrest and the confession, the
presence of intervening circumstances, and the purpose
and flagrancy of the official misconduct. Applying the
Brown test, the majority held that the state had met its
burden of showing that Rawlings' admission was'an act
of free will, unaffected by any illegality in the detention.
The police gave Miranda warnings to Rawlings moments
before he admitted ownership of the drugs. While not
much time elapsed between the initiation of the detention
and the admission, the Court stressed that the atmosphere
during this detention was congenial and that this factor
outweighed the short time lapse. Considering intervening
circumstances, the Court concluded that the fact that
Rawlings' admission was a spontaneous reaction to the
discovery of the drugs indicated that the admission was
an act of free will. Finally, the Court found that the
misconduct of the police was not so flagrant as to require
exclusion of the admission.
Regarding this unlawful search question, Justice
Rehnquist found that the search of Rawlings' person was
a valid search incident to arrest.
Justice White, joined by Justice Stewart, concurred in
part with the majority opinion. They took exception with
the Court's disposition of the issue whether the admission
was the fruit of an unlawful detention. Justice White
argued that the Court should remand to the state court
for a determination on the factual issue of whether the
admission was an act of free will. The state court did not
address this question and considered the facts of the
record incomplete. According to Justice White, the Court
The Court rejected Rawlings' contention that,
regardless of privacy expectations in the purse, his
ownership of the drugs vested him with the right
to challenge the legality of the search. While the
Court recognized ownership of seized goods as a
factor to be considered in deciding whether a de-
fendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy,
the Court noted that "Rakas emphatically rejected
the notion that 'arcane' concepts of property law
ought to control the ability to claim the protections
of the Fourth Amendment. ' 6 In reaching its de-
cision, the Court relied upon a number of fact6rs.
First, Rawlings had only known Cox for a few days
and he had never before sought or received access
to her purse. Second, Rawlings did not have any
right to exclude other persons from access to the
purse. Indeed, a third party had free access to the
purse, even on the day of the arrest. Finally, Rawl-
ings did not take precautions to maintain his pri-
vacy, and he admitted that he had "no subjective
expectation that Cox's purse would remain free
from governmental intrusion. ... "57
Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion ad-
dressing the majority's interpretation of Rakas. Jus-
tice Blackmun contended that the majority viewed
Rakas as setting forth a single inquiry of "whether
governmental officials violated any legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy held by the petitioner. ' '"s In
contrast to the majority, Justice Blackmun con-
strued Rakas as establishing two inquiries, both of
which must be satisfied in order for a defendant to
invoke the exclusionary rule successfully. The first
inquiry consisted of whether the search or seizure
infringed upon an interest protected by the fourth
amendment, and thus focused on whether the de-
fendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy.
The second inquiry is whether that search or sei-
zure violated the fourth amendment's probable
cause and warrant requirements. This dual inquiry
illustrates that one's legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy may be invaded and yet the police might
have acted legally. In another case, the police may
have acted illegally and yet one's privacy might
not have been invaded.
Justice Blackmun also argued that Rawlings
should therefore remand this question to the state court
for further factual determinations.
In dissent, Justice Marshall also argued that the ad-
mission was the fruit of the illegal detention and should
have been suppressed.
6 100 S. Ct. at 2562.
57 Id. at 2561.
58 Id. at 2564-65 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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should be confined to its facts. He emphasized that
a property interest, especially the right to exclude
others from the property, may often be a "principal
determinant in the establishment of a legitimate
Fourth Amendment interest."59 However, Justice
Blackmun agreed that Rawlings did not have the
right to exclude other persons from access to the
purse and that Rawlings' ownership interest in the
drugs was insufficient to create a privacy interest
in the purse.
Joined in dissent by Justice Brennan, Justice
Marshall attacked the Court's holding that an
individual cannot invoke the exclusionary rule
without showing that an unreasonable search or
seizure violated his legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy in the area searched.60 According to Justice
Marshall, the majority's position rejected the fun-
damental principle that an interest in either the
place searched or the property seized is sufficient
to invoke fourth amendment protections. He cited
a number of previous decisions in which the Su-
preme Court had found an interest in the property
seized sufficient to confer standing.6' Furthermore,
he asserted that the majority's reliance upon Rakas
was misplaced. The only issue resolved in Rakas
was whether fourth amendment protection derived
from a person's right to be on the premises
searched, or from his legitimate expectation of
privacy in those premises. Since Rakas focused only
on the place searched, Justice Marshall observed
that the Rakas defendants did not even assert own-
ership of the property seized as a ground for claim-
ing a fourth amendment deprivation.
In addition to contending that the majority
opinion was unsupported by Rakas and contrary to
precedent, the dissent declared that Rawlings was
contrary to the plain language of the fourth
amendment which guarantees to the people secu-
rity "in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." Jus-
tice Marshall reasoned that seizure of a person's
property interferes with his security in his effects.
Justice Marshall asserted that a person's interest in
property seized "is quite enough to establish that
59 Id. at 2565.
60 Id. at 2566-69 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
61 Id.; Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (show-
ing of ownership or possessory interests was required of a
defendant wishing to assert a fourth amendment objec-
tion); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (possession of
the seized property was sufficient to confer standing);
United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951) (standing to
object to a seizure cannot be separated from standing to
object to the search).
the defendant's personal Fourth Amendment rights
have been invaded by the government's
conduct. ' ' 2 Therefore, this person should not also
have to show a protected interest in the premises
searched. Justice Marshall contended that the
Court's sole emphasis on the place searched thus
"turned the development of the law of search and
seizure on its head.' ' 63 Moreover, Justice Marshall
argued that Katz did not exclude property interests
from fourth amendment protection but rather ex-
panded the "Fourth Amendment by recognizing
that privacy interests are protected even if they do
not arise from property rights." ' Since he under-
stood Rawlings to define the fourth amendment
exclusively in terms of privacy interests in the area
searched, Justice Marshall argued that Rawlings
destroyed the protection of property rights that the
fourth amendment was historically meant to af-
ford.
ANALYSIS
Similar to Salvucci, Rawlings further narrows the
scope of the exclusionary rule. Since Katz v. United
States,65 the Court has consistently abandoned the
notion that interests in property are alone sufficient
to confer standing. Jones had established that any-
one legitimately on the premises searched had
standing. Rakas v. Illinois rejected this standard as
"too broad a gauge for measurement of Fourth
Amendment rights." Salvucci refused to grant au-
tomatic standing to those charged with possessory
crimes. Finally, Rawlings rejected ownership of the
goods seized as a proxy for a fourth amendment
interest. Hence, the effect of Katz and Rakas has
been to redefine the fourth amendment in terms of
a reasonable or legitimate expectation of privacy.
An individual can demonstrate this legitimate ex-
pectation of privacy only by showing that he ex-
hibited an actual, or subjective, expectation that
society recognizes as reasonable.
6 7
The dissent argued that the majority opinion in
Rawlings is contrary to the fourth amendment be-
cause it denies protection to those with a possessory
interest in the property seized. Citing the fourth
amendment's language which guarantees people
the right to be secure in their effects, the dissent
6 100 S. Ct. at 2568 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
m Id.
64Id.
r" 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (person in a phone booth has
the protection of the fourth amendment against unrea-
sonable surveillance and recording of his conversations).
439 U.S. at 142.
6389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
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contended that this plain language means that
ownership of property seized vests a defendant with
the right to have illegally obtained evidence ex-
cluded. The majority's rejection of this contention
seems based upon two viewpoints which differ from
the dissent. First, the majority treats the exclusion-
ary rule as a means of deterring police misconduct,
not as a compensatory remedy6 or constitutional
right.69 However, in the dissent's view the exclu-
sionary rule serves as a constitutional remedy. Since
the exclusionary rule functions to deter police mis-
conduct and not to redress constitutional deprivxa-
tions, no defendant has a constitutional right to
exclusion under the fourth amendment. Rather,
exclusion is a judicially created remedy that the
Court utilizes only in those cases when deterrence
outweighs the detrimental effects of exclusion.
Rawlings holds that the exclusionary rule will only
be applied when the defendant's legitimate expec-
tation of privacy has been violated. Accordingly,
ownership of the drugs did not vest Rawlings with
a constitutional right to exclude the evidence.
The second area of disagreement between mem-
bers of the Rawlings Court consists of the majority's
application of the privacy test for more than simply
determining whether exclusion should be granted.
The majority also defined the fourth amendment
in terms of privacy interests and found that Rawl-
ings had not suffered any constitutional depriva-
tion by the seizure of his property. While the
language of the amendment seems precise, the
Court's decisions prior to Rawlings have recast
fourth amendment guarantees in general terms,
broadly defining the amendment as protecting only
legitimate expectations of privacy. This new defi-
nition constitutes an attempt to effectuate histori-
cal purposes of the fourth amendment, which was
enacted in response to English search and seizure
practices that invaded the privacy of citizens. The
principle that "a man's house was his castle" 70 and
that it should not be invaded unreasonably was
the foundation for the fourth amendment.7 There-
fore, the Court's recent redefining of the fourth
amendment apparently seeks to fulfill the original
intent of the amendment's framers to protect pri-
vacy interests in the place searched. Yet in the
process, the Court seems to have ignored the lan-
guage of the amendment itself. Under the plain
language of the amendment, Rawlings did appar-
ently suffer a constitutional deprivation. However,
68 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960).
69 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 486.
70 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. at 390.
71 Id.
due to the Court's redefinition, he suffered no
deprivation since the cutting edge for fourth
amendment protections is no longer property in-
terests, but rather is privacy rights.
Justice Marshall correctly noted that Katz was
not meant to redefine the fourth amendment pro-
tections exclusively in terms of privacy interests.
2
He viewed Katz as expanding the protections of the
amendment beyond property rights to include pri-
vacy interests.73 Indeed, the Katz Court explicitly
stated that "the Fourth Amendment cannot be
translated into a general constitutional 'right to
privacy.' That Amendment protects individual pri-
vacy against certain kinds of governmental intru-
sion, but its protections go further, and often have
nothing to do with privacy at all." 74
However, cases after Katz and dicta in Katz itself
foreshadowed the redefinition of the fourth amend-
ment exclusively in terms of privacy rights. 75 Rakas
interpreted Katz to say that "the capacity to claim
the protection of the Fourth Amendment depends
not upon a property right in the invaded place but
upon whether the person who claims the protection
of the Amendment has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in the invaded place. 76 While the Rakas
Court left open the question of whether a defend-
ant who had no privacy interest in the place
searched could base a fourth amendment claim
upon ownership of the evidence seized,77 the Court
indicated that property interests will generally be
sufficient to prove a legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy when these interests include the right to ex-
clude others.78 However, property interests in the
premises searched are not always sufficient to es-
tablish a legitimate expectation of privacy.79 A
logical corollary to this proposition is that property
interests in the items seized are not always sufficient
to establish a privacy right although the right to
exclude others may be a determining factor. In
fact, this conclusion was drawn in some circuit
courts after the Rakas decision.80
72 100 S. Ct. at 2568 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
73 id.
7' Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. at 350.
7' United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. at 2443.
76 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. at 143.77 Id. at 142 n.ll.
78 Id. at 143 n.12.
79 id.
80 United States v. Rios, 611 F.2d 1335, 1344 (10th
Cir. 1979) ("The focus is on the individual's legitimate
expectations of privacy in the area or the item subject to
search and seizure"); United States v. Dall, 608 F.2d 910,
914 (1st Cir. 1979) ("Ownership alone is not enough to
establish a reasonable and legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy").
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In Katz itself, the Court recognized that there
are situations in which a person has a strong own-
ership interest, yet is not entitled to invoke the
fourth amendment's protection since he did not
have a legitimate expectation of privacy. The
Court stated: "What a person knowingly exposes
to the public, even in his own home or office, is not
a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.... But
what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an
area accessible to the public, may be constitution-
ally protected.",8 ' In Rawlings, the defendant ad-
mitted that he had no subjective expectation of
privacy in the purse. Furthermore, the Court found
that he did not act to preserve any privacy in the
purse since it was accessible to at least one third
party. Thus, Rawlings failed to establish the Katz
twofold requirement of both a subjective and an
objective expectation of privacy. The majority also
noted that if Rawlings had placed his drugs in
plain view he could not have claimed a legitimate
expectation of privacy.82 Therefore, similar reason-
ing suggests that Rawlings had forfeited his fourth
amendment protections by placing the drugs in an
area where he did not have a privacy interest.
Rawlings appears to preclude a defendant from
ever invoking the exclusionary rule where the de-
fendant's property is located in a place in which
the defendant has no privacy interest. If the factual
situation in Rawlings had been such that Rawlings
had a subjective expectation of privacy in Cox's
purse and the right to exclude others from access
to it, then he probably would have had the legiti-
mate expectation of privacy necessary to trigger
fourth amendment protection. However, the cru-
cial factor in establishing such protection rights
would be the privacy interest in the place searched,
not ownership of the goods seized.
While under Rawlings mere ownership of the
goods seized is not alone sufficient to confer fourth
amendment standing, there is still the possibility
that a defendant might achieve standing on the
basis of a privacy interest in the evidence seized
with no privacy interest in the place searched. For
example, privacy interests in the evidence seized
might confer standing when the government ille-
gally searches the office of an attorney and seizes
records pertaining to a particular client. Under
Rawlings and Rakas, the attorney would have stand-
ing to challenge this search and seizure since a
person certainly has a legitimate expectation of
privacy in his office and personal records. The
question arises whether the client would have
"' 389 U.S. at 351-52.
8 100 S. Ct. at 2562.
standing if the government sought to use these
records in a criminal prosecution against the client.
Considering the nature of the attorney-client priv-
ilege,' the client would have a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the records seized even though
he would not have a privacy interest in the area
searched. In the situation described, the client
would have a subjective expectation of privacy in
the disclosures he made to his attorney and society
has recognized this expectation as reasonable.
Hence, the government's conduct appears to vio-
late the client's own legitimate expectation of pri-
vacy and he should have the right to invoke the
exclusionary rule. In this way, the defendant could
possibly prove standing without having to show a
privacy interest in the actual place searched.
UNITED STATES V. PA YNER
As in Salvucci and Rawlings, the defendant in
United States v. Payner84 lacked standing to invoke
the exclusionary rule. However, Payner presented
the additional issue of whether the supervisory
power of federal courts authorizes the suppression
of illegally obtained evidence where the defendant
lacks standing but proves that the government
acted intentionally to violate another's fourth
amendment rights.
Norman Casper, a private investigator retained
by the Internal Revenue Service, devised a scheme
to gain access to the records of a Bahamian bank.
This plan was approved by Richard Jaffe, a special
agent of the IRS. Casper became acquainted with
the vice-president of the bank, Michael Wolsten-
craft, and introduced him to Sybol Kennedy, Cas-
per's employee. On January 15, 1973, while Ken-
nedy and Wolstencraft went out to dinner, Casper
entered Kennedy's apartment and took Wolsten-
craft's briefcase. Casper delivered the briefcase to
Jaffe, who supervised the copying of documents
contained in it. The briefcase was returned to the
apartment before Kennedy and Wolstencraft re-
turned. Documents copied that night led to the
discovery of a 1972 loan agreement in which the
defendant, Jack Payner, pledged funds in a Ba-
hamian bank account as security for a loan. On
the basis of this agreement, Payner was indicted on
a charge of falsifying his 1972 federal income tax
return. The indictment alleged that Payner had
sz United States v. Pipkins, 528 F.2d 559,562 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 952 (1976). "The attorney-
client privilege prohibits the disclosure of the substance
of communications made in confidence by a client to his
attorney for the purpose of obtaining legal advice." Id.
4 100 S. Ct. 2439.
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knowingly failed to report a foreign bank account
when filing his return.
The district court found Payner guilty as
charged. However, the court suppressed evidence
of the loan agreement finding that it was the fruit
of a flagrantly illegal search. Although the district
court found that Payner had no standing under
the fourth amendment to invoke the exclusionary
rule,85 it suppressed the documentary evidence on
the basis of the due process clause of the fifth
amendment and the inherent supervisory power of
the federal courts.86 The district court reasoned
that the government's illegal conduct undertaken
with knowing and purposeful "bad faith hostility" to
fundamental constitutional rights required exclu-
sion. 7 The district court then set aside Payner's
conviction for lack of sufficient evidence.s
In a per curiam order, the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
holding that the district court properly exercised
its supervisory powers to suppress the evidence.
89
The Supreme Court reversed.
Justice Powell delivered the Court's six-to-three
decision. The Court held that evidence can be
excluded under the fourth amendment only if po-
lice violated the defendant's own fourth amend-
ment rights. Such a violation can occur only when
the illegal search or seizure has invaded a defend-
ant's own legitimate expectation of privacy rather
than that of a third party. The Court found that
Payner had no legitimate privacy interest in Wol-
stencraft's briefcase or bank documents 90 and that
he therefore lacked standing under the fourth
amendment to challenge the legality of the search.
With regard to the district court's use of the
federal supervisory power9' to suppress the bank
documents, the Court held that:
85 United States v. Payner, 434 F. Supp. 113,126 (N.D.
Ohio 1977).
8Id. at 129, 134-35.
87 Id. at 129 (emphasis in original).
88 See 100 S. Ct. at 2443 n.2. "The unusual sequence of
rulings was a byproduct of the consolidated hearing
conducted by the District Court .... Respondent does
not challenge these procedures." Id.
89 United States v. Payner, 590 F.2d 206 (6th Cir.
1979).
90 100 S. Ct. at 2444. In support of this finding, the
Court cited United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976),
which held that a depositor has no expectation of privacy
and no fourth amendment interest in copies of cheeks
and deposit slips held by his bank.
9' The Court has supervisory power over federal law
enforcement agencies, Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214
(1956), and over the proceedings of federal courts, Mes-
arosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1 (1956). According to
Mesarosh, the Court should use its supervisory powers in
federal criminal cases "to see that the waters of justice
are not polluted." Id. at 14.
the supervisory power does not authorize a federal
court to suppress otherwise admissible evidence on
the ground that it was seized unlawfully from a
third party not before the court. Our Fourth
Amendment decisions have established beyond any
doubt that the interest in deterring illegal searches
does not justify the exclusion of tainted evidence at
the instance of a party who was not the victim of
the challenged practices? 2
Justice Powell believed that the scope of the exclu-
sionary rule must be restricted in this way so as not
to unduly impair the ability of courts to ascertain
the truth in criminal prosecutions. 93 Since the
Court viewed the societal costs of the suppression
of reliable, probative evidence as unnecessarily
high, the Court refused to extend the supervisory
power of federal courts so as to allow indiscriminate
application of the exclusionary rule.
9 4
Chief Justice Burger filed a short concurring
opinion. He agreed that Payner could not invoke
the exclusionary rule, but believed that, under the
separation of powers, federal courts have no general
supervisory power over actions of the executive
branch.95 Hence, the Chief Justice implied that
that only the executive branch was empowered to
consider and correct the IRS agents' unlawful con-
duct.
Justice Marshall was joined in dissent by Justices
Brennan and Blackmun. The dissent emphasized
the district court's finding that the government
agents had intentionally manipulated the standing
requirements of the fourth amendment and that
they had acted with purposeful and bad faith
hostility toward fundamental constitutional
rights. 6 Relying upon the exclusionary rule's dual
rationale of deterrence of illegal police conduct and
preservation ofjudicial integrity, Justice Marshall
argued that supervisory powers should be utilized
to exclude evidence obtained through intentionally
illegal conduct in order to prevent the court from
becoming an accomplice to intentional miscon-
duct.97
The majority recognized and disputed the ar-
guments of the dissent. The majority noted that
92 100 S. Ct. at 2446.
9 id.
94 Id. at 2447.
95 Id. (Burger, J., concurring).
96 Id. at 2450 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
97 In support of this proposition, Justice Marshall cited
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206; Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957); Mesarosh v. United States,
352 U.S. 1; Upshaw v. United States, 335 U.S. 410
(1948); and McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332
(1943).
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the cases relied upon by the dissent were not con-
trolling because all of them involved a situation in
which the defendant's own rights were violated by
the illegality.9 8 In addition, Justice Powell sug-
gested that deterrence of police illegality and pro-
tection ofjudicial integrity constituted the ration-
ale for both the exclusionary rule and the supervi-
sory power9 However, Justice Powell further ar-
gued that deterrence did not constitute a suffi-
ciently strong interest in Payner to require exclusion
since the illegal conduct did not violate Payner's
rights. Consequently, society's interest in prosecut-
ing the guilty outweighed both the interest in
deterrence and the interest in judicial integrity.
Since this conclusion of the majority apparently
equated the exclusionary rule with the supervisory
power, Justice Marshall accused the majority of
rendering the supervisory powers superfluous.10
However, Justice Powell responded that Payner did
not limit the traditional scope of the supervisory
power, but rather only refused to extend it."
ANALYSIS
Consistent with its recent trend of narrowing the
scope of the exclusionary rule, the Payner Court
refused to allow exercise of the supervisory power
to exclude illegally obtained evidence even in a
case where the trier of fact found that the govern-
ment had engaged in illegal conduct intentionally
and with bad faith hostility toward a person's
constitutional rights. Payner suffered no fourth
amendment deprivation because he had no per-
sonal privacy right in the seized briefcase and
documents. Since he was thus not entitled to the
exclusionary rule's protections, the only issue was
whether the evidence should be excluded through
the use of the federal court's supervisory powers.
The Payner Court appears to equate the super-
visory powers with the exclusionary rule for pur-
poses of considering the admissibility of illegally
obtained evidence. Both are based upon policies of
deterrence of police misconduct and preservation
ofjudicial integrity. 02 However, the Court's treat-
ment of these two policies is problematic. The
Court's application of the supervisory powers fails
to give adequate consideration to the goal of pre-
serving judicial integrity. The negative impact on
the integrity of the judicial process is much greater
when illegally seized evidence is admitted where
98 100 S. Ct. at 2446-47.
9 Id.
'oo Id. at 2453 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"o1 Id. at 2447 n.8.
102 id.
the defendant proves that the governmental mis-
conduct was intentional rather than simply acci-
dental. Therefore, unlike Salvucci and Rawlings, Pay-
ner is a more compelling case for exclusion based
upon judicial integrity since Payner proved bad
faith hostility on the part of the government. In
the Payner situation, admission of the evidence gives
the appearance that the judiciary condones the
illegality. As Justice Marshall argued, the Court
has previously stressed "the need to use supervisory
powers to prevent the federal courts from becoming
accomplices to such misconduct."' 3 Hence, in Pay-
ner and other cases where government officials
acted in bad faith hostility to constitutional rights,
courts should have the power to exclude illegally
obtained evidence.
Refusal to exclude the evidence in cases such as
Payner also defeats the goal of deterring governmen-
tal misconduct. First, Payner illustrates that the
Court's construction of the exclusionary rule allows
the government purposefully to violate a person's
constitutional rights in order to obtain evidence
against a third party. Thus, the deterrent effect of
the exclusionary rule is incomplete. In intentional
misconduct cases, allowing exclusion of evidence
under the supervisory powers would substantially
deter such lawless governmental conduct and
would help prevent circumvention of the exclusion-
ary rule. Second, without the exclusion of such
evidence, governmental officials who intentionally
violate a person's rights often will not be chastised
for their misconduct unless that individual is pros-
ecuted. Payner illustrates this problem since the
governmental officials were not penalized for their
illegal actions, but rather benefited from them.
Finally, those individuals whose fourth amend-
ment rights were violated and who are not then
prosecuted are provided little if any relief under
our present system because of the difficulty of
proving damages.'0' Hence, many innocent citizens
are not compensated for their constitutional inju-
ries.
Many have argued that an alternative to the
exclusionary rule should be developed so that the
values of deterrence, truth finding, relief, and in-
tegrity can be better effected. Some observers sug-
gest that a civil remedy, more effective than our
present tort system, be developed in order to pro-
vide better remedies for fourth amendment viola-
tions.905 Others suggest that the legislature create
1'3 Id. at 2451 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'o' See Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and
Seizure, 37 U. CI. L. REv. 665, 718 (1970).1O5Id.
1980]
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a statutory civil remedy providing for monetary
compensation and for discipline of offending gov-
ernment officials through the judiciary, aided by
an independent review board.' 6 While problems
of implementation would inevitably plague such
proposals, they do offer a reasonable alternative to
the present system. Though the Court appears
strongly attached to the exclusionary rule at pres-
ent, the recent changes in the rule, the consistent
split of opinion within the Court, and the trend of
narrowing the scope of the rule all indicate a
dissatisfaction with the present system of dealing
with evidence obtained by illegal search and sei-
zure. Careful consideration should be given to the
suggestions that this evidence should be admitted
at trial while utilizing civil remedies and discipli-
nary hearings to pursue the goals of deterrence of
police misconduct and preservation of judicial in-
tegrity.
CONCLUSION
In Salvucci, Rawlings, and Payner, the majority of
the Court treats the exclusionary rule not as a
compensatory remedy 0 7 or constitutional right l08
but rather as a judicial device to deter police
misconduct. On the other hand, Justices Marshall
and Brennan in dissent attempt to use the exclu-
sionary rule as a constitutional remedy. However,
the Constitution nowhere prevents the use of reli-
able, illegally obtained evidence. The fourth
amendment only sets out the right of people to be
secure from unreasonable searches and seizures.
The means by which this right is to be effectuated
is left for the courts or legislature to determine.
lo S. SCHLESINGER, EXCLUSIONARY INJUsTIcE: THE
PROBLEM OF ILLEGALLY OBTAINED EVIDENCE 71-84
(1977).
107 See Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206.
'0s Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 486.
The Court has decided to use the exclusionary rule
to deter the police from violating fourth amend-
ment rights. However, exclusion of evidence for
deterrence purposes creates an inherent conflict
with the interest in admitting to trial all relevant,
reliable evidence. The Court has chosen to resolve
this dilemma by balancing deterrence against the
interest in prosecution of the guilty.
The decisions of this past term reflect a revital-
ized concern for truth-finding and prosecution of
the guilty and a judicial determination that the
goal of deterrence is sufficiently fulfilled by sup-
pressing only evidence obtained in violation of the
defendant's own fourth amendment rights. There-
fore, the effect of the Salucci, Rawlings, and Payner
decisions is to narrow the scope of the exclusionary
rule. Salvucci abolished automatic standing in pos-
sessory cases. Rawlings rejected the notion that mere
ownership interests in evidence seized was sufficient
to establish a fourth amendment interest. Finally,
Payner reaffirmed that a defendant is entitled to
exclusion only if the search and seizure violated his
own fourth amendment rights. Even in a case of
flagrantly illegal conduct by the government, lower
federal courts cannot exclude the evidence under
their supervisory powers unless the defendant's own
privacy rights were violated. The overall result of
these decisions is that a court may only exclude
evidence under the fourth amendment if it finds
that the defendant's own constitutional rights were
violated by an unlawful search or seizure. More-
over, a defendant's own constitutional rights are
violated only when his own legitimate expectation
of privacy is unreasonably invaded by the chal-
lenged conduct.1 9
REBECCA J. LAUER
I09 United States v. Payner, 100 S. Ct. at 2444.
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